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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Perceptual Precedence or Increased Effort?:
On the mechanism of the small-picture-size advantage in category learning
by
Toshiya Miyatsu
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological & Brain Sciences
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Mark McDaniel, Chairperson

I have previously identified a novel perceptual manipulation that enhances learning of some
complex natural categories, and the current dissertation aims to uncover its mechanism.
Specifically, learning of categories of tropical fish was enhanced when learned through small
pictures (about 2º) compared to large pictures (about 19º). Through analyzing the previous
results and extant theories in various domains, I identified two potential mechanisms through
which this small-picture-size advantage manifested. The perceptual precedence hypothesis
postulates that the processing of local dimensions is prioritized in large pictures and the
processing of global dimensions is prioritized in small pictures. Therefore, small picture size
should enhance category learning only when a global dimension is diagnostic (e.g., the exterior
shape in the tropical fish categories). The increased effort hypothesis postulates that because
small pictures are harder to process than large pictures, it creates a metacognitive sense of
disfluency, and that perceptual disfluency engages learners in a more effortful and analytical
processing of the stimuli. Thus, this theory predicts that small picture size should enhance
category learning whether the diagnostic dimension is local or global. Two experiments directly
pitted these unique predictions by the two theories against each other; participants studied
ix

category structure with either a global diagnostic dimension or local diagnostic dimensions.
These experiments not only replicated the small-picture-size advantage, but also showed a largepicture-size advantage when local dimensions were diagnostic. The findings supported the
perceptual precedence hypothesis and suggested that the picture-size effect is category-structurespecific rather than category-structure-general. The effects of the size manipulation on learners’
metacognition is also discussed.

x

Chapter 1: Introduction
Recognizing a visually perceived object as a member of a certain category is a fundamental and
ubiquitous component of human cognition that enables us to act upon the environment efficiently
(Murphy, 2002). As such, category learning has been studied extensively in psychology and is
involved in many meaningful contexts in the society, such as K-12 and higher education (e.g.,
teaching categories of rocks in geological science courses), physician training (e.g., radiologists
learning to distinguish between malignant and benign tumors), and military training (e.g.,
learning to detect abnormalities on the ground surface that may signal a presence of a land mine).
Accordingly, strong interest exists in discovering ways to improve category learning for various
purposes, and researchers have recently made efforts towards discovering manipulations that
enhance category learning (e.g., interleaving: Kornell & Bjork, 2008; test-enhanced learning:
Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Coane, 2010; exemplar variability: Wahlheim, Finn, & Jacoby, 2012;
fading of diagnostic features: Pashler, & Mozer, 2013; feature highlighting: Miyatsu,
Gouravajhala, Nosofsky, & McDaniel, 2018; specific-level training: Miyatsu, Nosofsky, &
McDaniel, in press; Nosofsky, Sanders, Gerdom, Douglas, & McDaniel, 2017). While these
studies have examined factors, such as the selection of the training example set, the sequencing
of examples during training, and the type of processing occurring during training, little research
has been conducted to examine the potential benefit of manipulating simple perceptual
characteristics of the way training examples are presented. In this dissertation, I will report five
previous experiments that I have conducted to establish a novel perceptual manipulation that
enhances category learning, sketch out two hypotheses regarding the mechanisms underlying this
effect, and report two new experiments that tested unique predictions derived from these two
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hypotheses. In addition, I will investigate the effect of the size manipulation on learners’
metacognition and provide two frameworks through which the results on metacognition can be
interpreted.
In a typical category learning experiment, participants study example pictures of the
categories to be learned one by one for a few seconds each in the training phase. Participants’
learning is assessed later by asking them to classify new pictures into the learned categories. The
critical manipulation that will be discussed throughout the current dissertation is to present these
training examples in a small as opposed to a large size. This manipulation was motivated by
recent technological advances that changed the way we consume and present information as well
as by a recent literature on the effect of stimulus size on human metacognition. First, the
variability of the size of the screens through which we consume information is greater than ever
today. It is becoming increasingly more common to read texts, view photos, and watch videos
from different devices with various screen sizes, such as a desktop monitor, a large flat screen
TV, and a smartphone. That is, people today often consume the same information from screens
of varying sizes. From a standpoint of enhancing category learning instruction and training, the
size manipulation, if proven to be fruitful, carries great value because it could be easily applied
to example pictures of any categories using photo-processing software, presentation software, or
even just printing photos in various sizes. Second, as will be described below, a recent literature
showed that learners’ metacognition in word-list learning was affected by the stimulus size
independent from their word-memorization performance, so it seemed possible that this
stimulus-size effect on metacognition extends to a more complex learning situation like learning
categories of natural objects.
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Many may assume that the size in which a picture or any stimulus is presented would
have no effects on human cognition. After all, it is the same picture that is presented, and the
information contained in the picture does not change. However, a careful review of distant
literatures spread across psychology, business and marketing, and human factor research showed
that stimulus size affects perception, attention, emotion, object processing, and various
subjective judgments (Miyatsu, in preparation). Although the stimulus-size manipulation has not
been investigated in the context of category learning, some of these findings suggest that it may
have effects on both the learning and the metacognitive aspects of category learning. First,
stimulus size may affect the category learning itself. Larger stimuli are generally processed more
quickly, and identification of objects are less accurate for smaller pictures (e.g., Breitmeyer &
Breier, 1994; Schultz & Eriksen, 1978). A straightforward prediction from these findings is that
people learn categories better from larger pictures. However, as I will elaborate in detail after
presenting my previous experiments investigating the effect of the picture-size manipulation on
category learning in the next chapter, some tasks are actually performed better when the stimuli
are presented in smaller sizes. Thus, it is possible that small pictures promote better category
learning than large pictures.
Second, metacognition, in particular learners’ own understanding of how well they have
learned the categories, may be affected by the picture-size manipulation. When learning lists of
words and word pairs, people claim to have learned better from a larger compared to smaller font
size although there is no memory performance difference between information presented in
different font sizes (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2008). This is because people have a belief that larger
stimuli are better for remembering (e.g., Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2013) and
because larger stimuli are processed more quickly and create a greater sense of fluency (e.g.,
3

Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Susser, Mulligan, & Besken, 2013). According to the cue-utilization
framework (Koriat, 1997), both the belief and the perceptual fluency can be used as a cue to
make judgements of learning resulting in the metacognitive illusion. Because people may have a
similar belief that larger pictures are better for learning categories and because larger pictures are
processed more quickly, it seems possible that a similar metacognitive illusion arises from the
picture-size manipulation in category learning where people claim to have learned better from
larger pictures regardless of whether they actually performed better with the larger pictures.
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Chapter 2: Previous Experiments
Motivated by the potential picture-size effects on category learning and metacognition as
described above, I conducted five preliminary experiments. In all five of these unpublished
experiments reported in this section, the example pictures from the half of the categories were
presented in a small size (e.g., about 2 degree of visual angle: a fish picture of 1 inch in width
viewed from 30 inches) while the example pictures from the other half of the categories were
presented in a large size (e.g., about 19 degree of visual angle: a fish picture of 10 inches in
width viewed from 30 inches). These sizes were determined to achieve the smallest size in which
all the features in the pictures could still be identified and the largest size that could be presented
on laboratory computer screens without scrolling.
The five experiments differed in the category structure that participants studied. The
category structure of a category learning experiment can be characterized by its dimensions and
the diagnosticity of these dimensions while individual category can be characterized by its
unique features. A dimension in category learning refers to an aspect of stimuli that varies from
instance to instance. For example, in the tropical fish categories shown in Figure 1, the exterior
shape, the colors, and the pattern expressed in the body are dimensions. Diagnosticity refers to
how useful a given dimension is in defining the categories. For example, in each of the
categories shown in Figure 1, the color and pattern vary widely among the instances within a
category, but the exterior shape stays relatively consistent. That is, the exterior shape is a
diagnostic dimension in this category structure. Features refer to the particular values expressed
within dimensions. Each category expresses unique features within a diagnostic dimension. For
example, in the fish categories shown in Figure 1, angelfish (left most column) have a dorsal fin,
5

an anal fin (two fins on the top and the bottom of the body towards the tail), and a pointy mouth
that form an arrowhead shape along the body, blenny (second to left most column) have a thin
body without sharp fins, and triggerfish (right most column) have an oval shape body with
distinctive dorsal and anal fins.
Figure 1. Example pictures from the tropical fish family classification experiment (Previous Experiment
1). All the pictures in the same column come from one family. From the left to right, angelfish, blenny,
filefish, goby, and triggerfish.

6

The category structure in the experiments that will be described next was varied to assess
which dimensions the picture-size manipulation is sensitive to and under what circumstances
(i.e., the presence or absence of other dimensions and their diagnosticity) the manipulation
affects learning. Because all five experiments had the same method except the materials that
were learned, I first describe the general procedure that was uniform in all five experiments, and
then describe the category structure used in each experiment and their results in turn.

2.1 General Procedure
In all five experiments, participants studied and classified pictures of 12 categories of tropical
fish. First, participants were presented with 72 pictures, six from each of the 12 categories, one
by one for 5 seconds each. The order of the presentation was block-randomized, such that each
block of 12 pictures included one picture from each of the 12 categories. Importantly, pictures
from half of the 12 categories were presented in the small (about 2º in the previous Experiments
1-3; about 1º in the previous Experiments 4 and 5) while pictures from the other half of the
categories were presented in the large size (about 19º). After studying the 6th and final example
from each category, the participants indicated how well they learned a given category on a scale
of 0 – 100 (category learning judgement: CLJ). Then, the participants played tetris for 3 minutes
as a distractor before completing the final test. In the final test, participants were presented with
48 new pictures of tropical fish one by one in a neutral size (about 11º) and asked to classify
them by clicking on one of 12 options labeled with the names of the 12 learned categories. They
were given up to 10 seconds for each final test trial. The order of the final test was blockrandomized, such that in a given block of 12 items, there was one item from each of the 12
categories. Upon completing the final test, participants answered a post-experimental question
about which picture size they thought helped learn the fish categories better.
7

2.2 Previous Experiment 1
(family-level classification – the exterior shape diagnostic)
The initial experiment was run using the materials shown in Figure 1. In this experiment,
participants learned the categories of tropical fish families (n = 60). As described above, the
exterior shape is the predominant diagnostic dimension in this category structure. Figure 2 shows
the results of this experiment. As shown in the left panel of the Figure 2, the classification
performance was higher for the categories presented in the small size compared to the ones
presented in the large size, t(59) = 2.31, p < .05, d = 0.38. Moreover, as indicated by both CLJs
(i.e., learning judgement before the final test) and the post-experimental question, participants
reported that they felt as if they learned better from the large pictures. To foreshadow, in all five
experiments reported in this section, these patterns of results on CLJs and the post-experimental
question held up. Because the current study primarily focuses on the classification performance
aspect of the small-picture-size effect, I will omit the description of the results regarding the
CLJs and post-experimental question for the remainder of this section. However, these results
and their theoretical interpretations will be discussed in later chapters.
Figure 2. Participants’ mean classification performance (left panel), mean CLJ ratings (middle panel),
and post-experimental judgement on which picture size they learned better from, from Previous
Experiment 1. The error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
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2.3 Previous Experiment 2
(family-level vs abstract outline classification – the exterior
shape diagnostic but no color)
In the next experiment, half the participants learned the family-level classification (i.e., identical
to Previous Experiment 1; n = 57) while the other half learned the same categories without color
(abstract outline; see Figure 3; n = 57).
Figure 3. Example pictures from the tropical fish family classification experiment using abstract outline
(i.e., no color: Previous Experiment 2). All the pictures in the same column come from one family. From
the left to right, angelfish, blenny, filefish, goby, and triggerfish.
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The purposes of this experiment were to replicate the findings from the previous Experiment 1 as
well as to examine the effect when the color, a salient dimension1 that varied widely at the family
level, was absent. Figure 4 shows the results of this experiment. A 2 (size: small or large) x 2
(category condition: family classification or abstract outline) mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on the classification performance data showed a significant main effect of the size,
such that categories presented in the small size were learned better, F(1, 112) = 14.78, p < .001,
ηp2 = .12, a significant main effect of the category condition, such that the participants in the
family-level classification condition performed better than the ones in the abstract outline
classification condition, F(1, 112) = 24.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, and a marginally significant
interaction between these variables, F(1, 112) = 3.44, p < .10, ηp2 = .03. Post-hoc paired-sample
t-tests showed that the small-picture-size advantage in the family-level classification condition
did not reach significance, t(56) = 1.47, p = .15, d = 0.23, whereas it was significant in the
abstract outline condition t(56) = 3.87, p < .001, d = 0.72. Thus, the small-picture-size advantage
was extended to when the color, a salient dimension, was absent. However, the effect on the
family-level classification did not fully replicate.
Figure 4. Participants’ mean classification performance (left panel), mean CLJ ratings (middle panel),
and post-experimental judgement on which picture size they learned better from, from Previous
Experiment 2. The data for the post-experimental judgement were combined between the familyclassification and abstract outline conditions because they showed the same pattern. The error bars
represent ± 1 SEM.

1

For example, in a previous study involving classification of venomous and non-venomous snake categories,
participants were unable to learn the categories without being instructed that the color was not diagnostic,
demonstrating the salience of this dimension (Noh, Yan, Vendetti, Castel, & Bjork, 2014).
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2.4 Previous Experiment 3
(family-level vs species-level classification – the exterior
shape diagnostic vs the exterior & pattern/color diagnostic)
In the third experiment, half the participants learned the family-level classification (i.e., identical
to the previous Experiments 1 and 2; n = 45) while the other half learned the species-level
classification (n = 46). At the species level of classification, not only the exterior shape, but also
the pattern/color expressed on the body is highly diagnostic (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Example pictures from the tropical fish species classification experiment (Previous Experiment
3). All the pictures in the same column come from one species. From the left to right, angelfish, blenny,
filefish, goby, and triggerfish.
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The purposes of this experiment were to further assess the reliability of the small-picture-size
effect on the family-level classification as well as to examine the effect when other highly
diagnostic dimensions were available. A 2 (size: small or large) x 2 (category condition: familylevel or species-level classification) mixed ANOVA on the classification performance data
showed a significant main effect of the size, such that categories presented in the small size were
learned better, F(1, 89) = 73.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .45, a significant main effect of the category
condition, such that the participants in the species-level classification condition performed better
than the ones in the family-level classification condition, F(1, 89) = 67.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .43,
and a non-significant interaction between these variables, F(1, 89) = 1.70, p > .05, ηp2 = .02.
12

Thus, the small-picture-size effect at the family-level classification appeared reliable and the
effect was also extended to when multiple diagnostic dimensions, the exterior shape and
pattern/color, were present.
Figure 6. Participants’ mean classification performance (left panel), mean CLJ ratings (middle panel),
and post-experimental judgement on which picture size they learned better from, from Previous
Experiment 3. The data for the post-experimental judgement were combined between the family and
species conditions because they showed the same pattern. The error bars represent ± 1 SEM.

2.5 Previous Experiment 4
(species-level vs species outline classification – the exterior
& pattern/color diagnostic vs the exterior shape was the only
dimension present)
In the fourth experiment, half the participants learned the species-level classification (i.e.,
identical to Previous Experiment 3; n = 40) while the other half learned the same categories with
only the outline (species outline; see Figure 7; n = 38).
Figure 7. Example pictures from the tropical fish species outline classification experiment (Previous
Experiment 4). All the pictures in the same column come from one species. From the left to right,
angelfish, blenny, filefish, goby, and triggerfish.
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The purposes were to replicate the findings from the previous Experiment 3 on the species-level
classification as well as to examine the effect when all other dimensions, except the exterior
shape, were absent. The working hypothesis at that time was that the small-picture size enhanced
learning through shifting learners’ attention from the periphery of the stimulus when small to the
details inside of the perimeter when large. Thus, the idea was that if the attentional shift from the
periphery (i.e., the exterior shape) to the details inside indeed was the underlying mechanism, the
small-picture-size advantage should vanish in the outline condition because there were no other
dimensions to pay attention to even when the pictures were presented in the large size. In
addition, a smaller small-size manipulation was implemented in this and the following
experiment to see the generality of this manipulation (about 2º in the previous Experiments 1-3;
about 1º in the previous Experiments 4 and 5).
14

Figure 8 shows the results of this experiment. A 2 (size: small or large) x 2 (category
condition: species classification or outline) mixed ANOVA on the classification performance
data showed a significant main effect of the size, such that categories presented in the small size
were learned better, F(1, 76) = 23.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, a significant main effect of the
category condition, such that the participants in the species-level classification condition
performed better than the ones in the species outline classification condition, F(1, 76) = 4.92, p <
.05, ηp2 = .06, and a significant interaction between these variables, F(1, 76) = 5.87, p < .05, ηp2
= .07. Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests showed that the small-picture-size advantage in the specieslevel classification condition was significant, t(39) = 5.69, p > .001, d = 0.83, whereas it did not
reach significance in the abstract outline condition, t(37) = 1.54, p = .13, d = 0.29. In short, the
small-picture-size effect at the species level was replicated and was extended to an even smaller
picture size, and the lack of (or at least diminished) effect in the outline condition suggested that
some kind of attention shift from other dimensions to the exterior shape may underlie the effect.
Figure 8. Participants’ mean classification performance (left panel), mean CLJ ratings (middle panel),
and post-experimental judgement on which picture size they learned better from, from Previous
Experiment 4. The data for the post-experimental judgement were combined between the species and
outline conditions because they showed the same pattern. The error bars represent ± 1 SEM.

2.6 Previous Experiment 5
(artificial category classification – the pattern/color
diagnostic)
15

In the fifth experiment, participants learned an artificial fish category structure in which the
pattern/color on the body, but not the exterior shape, was diagnostic. This category structure was
created by tracing and cutting out the body pattern of twelve fish species in the shapes of twelve
different fish species and presented the examples that had the consistent body pattern/color to be
a category (see Figure 9; n= 60).
Figure 9. Example pictures from the tropical fish classification experiment using the artificial fish stimuli
(Previous Experiment 5) in which the body pattern/color was the predominant diagnostic dimension. Each
row represents a category.

The idea was to test the attentional shift hypothesis described above; if the small-picture size
enhanced learning in the previous experiments through shifting learners’ attention to the
16

periphery of the stimulus when small and to the details inside of the perimeter when large, the
large size should outperform the small size in learning this category structure because the details
inside are now diagnostic. Figure 10 shows the results of this experiment. To my surprise,
participants still performed better on the categories that were presented in the small compared to
the large size, t(59) = 7.44, p < .001, d = 1.04. Thus, the picture-size manipulation turned out to
be sensitive not only to the exterior shape but also to the pattern/color expressed in the body of
the fish pictures.
Figure 10. Participants’ mean classification performance (left panel), mean CLJ ratings (middle panel),
and post-experimental judgement on which picture size they learned better from, from Previous
Experiment 5. The error bars represent ± 1 SEM.

2.7 Previous Experiments Summary
To sum up the previous findings, the small-picture size enhanced category learning when the
exterior shape was the predominant diagnostic dimension (the previous Experiments 1, 2, and 3),
when the color was absent (the previous Experiment 2), and when there were other dimensions
that were highly diagnostic (i.e., pattern/color; the previous Experiments 3 and 4). However, the
effect vanished, or at the very least it was decreased, when there were no other dimensions
except the exterior shape, suggesting some kind of attentional shift elicited by the picture-size
manipulation (the previous Experiment 4). Finally, the picture-size manipulation was shown to
be sensitive not only to the exterior shape but also to the pattern/color expressed in the body
17

(Previous Experiment 5) when these dimensions were diagnostic. In addition, in all of these
experiments, participants showed a large-size bias in metacognitive measures; they claimed to
have learned better from the large pictures both after the learning and after the test. In the
following section, I will propose two plausible hypotheses that can accommodate the findings on
category learning and draw out unique predictions made by these hypotheses. Further, I will
provide two frameworks that can shed light on how learners make metacognitive judgements and
draw predictions from these viewpoints on the effect of the picture-size manipulation on
category learning judgements.
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Chapter 3: Potential Mechanisms
3.1 On the Picture-Size Effect on Category Learning
3.1.1 The Perceptual Precedence Hypothesis
What do the exterior shape and the body pattern, the dimensions that are sensitive to the picturesize manipulation, have in common? One possibility is that they are both dimensions that are
expressed globally. That is, an entire stimulus needs to be scanned to encode these dimensions.
For example, encoding of an entire fish picture is necessary to extract the exterior shape which
informs the height-to-width ratio and the shapes of the features expressed in the periphery.
Similarly, an entire stimulus needs to be encoded to extract the characteristic features that are
expressed throughout the body, such as a category of fish having dots all over the body or having
a few lines that run across the entire body horizontally.
One theory that was originated in a classic cognitive literature suggests that certain
dimensions receives prioritized processing depending on the size of the stimulus. Navon (1977,
1981) claimed that people were attuned to extracting the global elements of an object before
extracting the local elements, a tendency termed global precedence. In this line of research,
subjects typically studied large letters made up of small letters (see Figure 11), and the reaction
time to various tasks targeting the global and the local elements were assessed.
Figure 11. Typical stimuli used in experiments investigating the global precedence effects. Reprinted
from “Do response time advantage and interference reflect the order of processing of global-and locallevel information?” by Lamb, M. R., & Robertson, L. C. (1989), Attention, Perception, &
Psychophysics, 46(3), 254-258.

19

Two patterns of results were often taken as evidence for global precedence: a faster reaction time
when targeting global information and a greater interference by global information to local target
than the interference from local information to global target when the global and the local
information conflicted (e.g., a large letter “A” is made up of small letters “S”).
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However, a closer examination of this literature suggests a more nuanced interaction.
Kinchla and Wolfe (1979) were the first to report that the global or the local advantage interacted
with the size of the stimuli (see also, Lamb & Robertson, 1989; 1990; Mena, 1992; but see
Navon & Norman, 1983). They had subjects indicate whether a specified letter was present or
absent in a given stimulus that were varied in their size. Subjects responded faster to a large letter
when the stimuli were small whereas they responded faster to small letters when the stimuli were
large. In interpreting these results, they proposed a model of perceptual precedence based on the
size or the spatial frequency of stimuli. The model postulates that there is a critical sampling
bandwidth (range of size or spatial frequencies) from which the element that is initially
processed is selected, and the processing of other elements (more global or local) occurs
subsequently.
This interaction between the stimulus size and the element that receives a prioritized
processing has been extended to a more complex, picture material as well. Antes and Mann
(1984) presented subjects with a series of line drawings consisting of local elements (e.g., boat or
tractor) and a global element (e.g., beach or farm). In half the drawings, the local and the global
elements were thematically consistent while in the other half they were inconsistent (e.g., a boat
in a farm; see Figure 12).
Figure 12. Examples of pictures used in Antes and Mann (1982). The global-local consistent pictures are
on the left and the global-local inconsistent pictures are on the right. Reprinted from “Global-local
precedence in picture processing,” by Antes, J. R., & Mann, S. W. (1984), Psychological Research, 46(3),
247-259.
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Subjects responded to each drawing by answering a question, "Is this the (name of local or global
element)?" The results showed a size-dependent local and global precedence, such that the
subjects were faster to judge the local elements in large pictures, but the response time did not
differ between when judging the local and the global elements in small pictures. In addition, the
thematic inconsistency produced a greater interference when identifying the local element in
small pictures (i.e., interference from the global element), but the opposite was true for large
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pictures; the thematic inconsistency did not produce any interference when identifying the local
elements in large pictures while it greatly slowed down the reaction when identifying the global
element.
A similar interaction has been also observed in other areas of cognitive psychology. For
example, the performance in the Embedded Figure Test on which subjects identify a smaller
simple figure embedded within a larger, more complex figure (see Figure 13) was enhanced in
larger stimuli (Streibel & Ebenholtz, 1982).
Figure 13. A sample question from the Embedded Figures Test. The task is to identify the simple shape
shown on bottom within the complex shape shown on top. Reprinted from “Embedded Figures Test
(EFT),” by Happé, F. (2013), In Encyclopedia of Autism Spectrum Disorders (pp. 1077-1078). New York,
NY: Springer.
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This finding can be interpreted as participants’ attention drawn first to the local elements, shapes
expressed in a part of a figure, in a larger size whereas the attention was first drawn to more
encompassing shapes in a smaller size. Further, in the field of perceptual expertise using human
face stimuli, smaller picture sizes have been shown to elicit holistic processing whereas larger
sizes elicit processing of specific parts (Tanaka J. W., personal communication, February 2018).
This interaction between the stimulus size and the prioritized processing of the local or
the global elements observed in the various fields and across many kinds of stimuli suggests the
perceptual precedence hypothesis of the small-picture-size advantage on category learning.
Specifically, when the fish pictures are presented in a large size, learners’ attention is drawn first
to the local dimensions (e.g., shape of a fin, color around the eye) because the size in which these
features are expressed presumably fall within the critical bandwidth. On the contrary, when the
fish pictures are presented in a small size, learners’ attention is drawn first to the global
dimensions (e.g., exterior shape, pattern on the whole body), and the processing of the local
dimensions happens only after the processing of the global dimension is completed. Thus, within
a given trial that lasted for only several seconds (5 seconds in the previous experiments), the
global dimensions ended up being fully processed whereas the local dimensions were often only
partially processed (but it did not matter because these dimensions were not diagnostic), resulting
in the small-picture-size advantage in the previous experiments.
The original perceptual precedence theory (Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979) proposed a “middleout” sequence (as opposed to the “top-down” sequence suggested by Navon; i.e., global
precedence) through which different elements in a visual object are encoded and stated that an
element that falls within “a critical bandwidth” is processed first. I expand this theory by
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postulating that this critical bandwidth is a product of some basic characteristics of human visual
field and how the ease of extracting given features change because of them.
Human visual fields have two important characteristics that are relevant to the current,
“middle-out” theory. First, the visual acuity decreases drastically as it gets further from the
center of the visual field (i.e., fovea) and this is especially true for detecting finer features of an
object (Hilz & Cavonius, 1974). Figure 14 shows the relative acuity of the human eye (left) on
the horizontal meridian in degrees (visual angle) from foveal vision (Hunziker, 2006).
Figure 14. The relative acuity of the human eye (left) on the horizontal meridian in degrees visual angle
from foveal vision. Reprinted from “Im Auge des Lesers: foveale und periphere Wahrnehmung-vom
Buchstabieren zur Lesefreude. (The Eye of the Reader: Foveal and Peripheral Perception-from Letter
Recognition to the Joy of Reading),” by Hunziker, H. W. (2006). Zürich, Switzerland: Stäubli.
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At a distance of 30 inches (the distance between participants’ eyes and the monitor in the
previous experiments and a common distance between a desktop monitor and user’s eyes), offcentering the target object by just 3 degree (i.e., 1.5 inches) would decrease the acuity in half.
This limitation elicits gaze shifts in an attempt to capture objects that are significantly larger than
the high acuity area on the center of the visual field, making it more difficult to encode such
features compared to smaller ones. However, objects that are too small are also more difficult to
encode because the visual acuity decreases as the target object becomes smaller (e.g., Mead,
1943), the characteristic that serves as the basis for the visual acuity test (i.e., the eye exam).
Therefore, human visual field has a built-in middle-out system depending on the size of the
target object.
Critically, the perceptual precedence hypothesis makes a unique prediction that has not
been tested; if category learning took place using a category structure in which local dimensions
were diagnostic, the large-picture size should be superior to the small-picture size (assuming that
the size in which the diagnostic local dimension was expressed was within the critical
bandwidth), or at the very least, the small-picture-size advantage should vanish. That is, this
hypothesis postulates that the benefits of the picture-size manipulation is category-structurespecific. Specifically, category structures with a global diagnostic dimension(s) should benefit
from the small-picture size because the order of processing elicited by the small size is
appropriate for this category structure. Likewise, category structures with a local diagnostic
dimension(s) should benefit from the large-picture size. These predictions will be tested in the
experiments reported in the following chapter.
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3.1.2 The Increased Effort Hypothesis
Another possible theoretical interpretation of the previous results is that the small-picture-size
advantage emerged as a result of increased effort caused by perceptual disfluency. Perceptual
disfluency manipulations, defined as perceptual manipulations that make the processing of the
stimulus more difficult and slow down the encoding, have been shown to enhance learning of
verbal materials. For example, presenting words upside down (i.e., uoᴉsɹǝʌuᴉ: Sungkhasettee,
Friedman, & Castel, 2011) and presenting texts in a more difficult to read font (e.g., Comic
Sans MS in grey: Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughan, 2011) have been shown to
enhance learning of word lists and text comprehension respectively (but see Eitel, Kühl, Scheiter,
& Gerjets, 2014; Meyer et al. 2015; Yue, Castel, & Bjork, 2013). The idea is that the
metacognitive sense of difficulty in reading a font that is slightly harder to read signals the
learners that they do not have mastery over the material, and as a result, it invites a more effortful
and analytical processing (Kuhl & Eitel, 2016; Yue, et al., 2013).
Although the perceptual disfluency has never been shown to enhance category learning,
if a manipulation led to an increased effort, it seems possible that category learning would be
enhanced. The small-picture size is a perceptual disfluency manipulation because in general,
encoding of smaller objects is harder and slower than encoding of larger objects. For example,
simple recognition of shapes, color patches, and letters are slower for smaller objects
(Breitmeyer & Breier, 1994; Schultz & Eriksen, 1978; Sperandio, Savazzi, Gregory, & Marzi,
2009), and slower reaction time is a primary evidence of perceptual disfluency. In addition, the
reduced sense of learning reported through CLJs and the post-experimental question in the
previous experiments may be a reflection of this sense of disfluency experienced by the
participants. Thus, this increased effort hypothesis postulates that the small-picture-size
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advantage emerges because the small pictures give a sense of disfluency, and that in turn engages
learners in a more effortful processing of the stimuli.
Importantly, the increased effort hypothesis makes a contrasting prediction to the
perceptual precedence hypothesis. It predicts that the small-picture size would enhance learning
regardless of what the diagnostic dimension of a given category structure is. In other words, this
hypothesis assumes that the benefit of the picture-size manipulation is category-structuregeneral. Specifically, the disfluency elicited by small pictures should lead to an increased effort
regardless of whether the category structure has global or local diagnostic dimensions. In the
next chapter, I will describe how these competing predictions by the two hypotheses were tested
in the current experiments.

3.2 On the Metacognitive Accuracy in Category Learning
Because there has been only a handful of studies that investigated participants’ online
metacognitive understanding of their own category learning (i.e., CLJs; Doyle & Hourihan,
2016; Jacoby, et al., 2010; Wahlheim & DeSoto, 2016; Wahlheim, et al., 2011; Wahlheim, et al.,
2012), theorization on the cognitive processes leading to metacognitive judgements in this
situation is still limited. However, the well-established literatures on the nature of several types
of metamemory judgements in the verbal learning tradition can give us ideas about the
underlying processes when making similar metacognitive judgments in category learning.

3.2.1 The Direct-Access and Retrieval View
Historical views on the nature of metamemory assumed that learners had an internal monitor that
could examine the degree of learning of a given material in a fairly unbiased manner (Hart, 1967;
Burke, MacKay, Worthley, & Wade, 1991). For example, in experiments investigating the tip-ofthe-tongue state (TOT: failure to recall information accompanied with successful retrieval of
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some surrounding information and a sense that the retrieval of the target information is
imminent), learners can accurately predict which of the information that they could not recall
could be correctly recognized if presented with the correct answers (e.g., Brown, 2011). That is,
even when the target information was not successfully retrieved, learners could distinguish
between the information that had a stronger representation in their memory from the weaker
ones. This discriminative validity of such judgements suggests that learners can directly monitor
the degree of learning. In addition to this subjective feeling of learning or strength of memory,
many researchers have proposed a retrieval process to be a part of the metamemory judgements.
For example, Benjamin (2008) described a two-process theory in which the subjective feeling
(he called it matching) is followed by an explicit retrieval attempt of the target information. The
retrieval fluency derived from such retrieval attempt (i.e., how readily the information comes to
mind) has been shown to affect metacognitive judgments, and it ought to be useful in many
situations because in general, information that is better learned is more readily retrievable
(Benjamin & Bjork, 1994; c.f., Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998). Thus, the direct-access and
retrieval view posits that learners can make accurate metacognitive judgments based on the
subjective feeling of learning and the retrieval fluency derived from the explicit retrieval
attempts. In the current scenario of category learning judgements (CLJs) in category learning, the
feeling of familiarity and the sense of learning when presented with an example from a category
and prompted to make a CLJ, combined with how readily another example or characteristic
features of that category comes to mind, could provide sufficient information to make accurate
CLJs. Therefore, this view suggests that although there seemed to be a persistent large-size bias
in the previous experiments reported in the previous chapter, learners’ metacognition can be
accurate in some situations as will be investigated in the next chapter.
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The extant literature on category learning using CLJs provides some support for this
view. All three studies that examined the resolution of CLJs by correlating CLJs and
classification performance at the participant-level showed a significant correlation between these
measures when examined through Pearson correlation (Wahlheim & DeSoto, 2016: range: .24.29) as well as Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma (Jacoby, et al., 2010: range: .31-.33; Wahlheim,
et al., 2011: range: .47-.49). In addition, participants’ CLJs were sensitive to some manipulations
that enhanced category learning, such as testing (Jacoby, et al., 2010) and interleaving
(Wahlheim, et al., 2011). Thus, it seems possible that participants’ CLJs will show some degree
of discriminative validity when examined through correlation and be sensitive to the benefit of
the picture-size manipulation when examined in different category structures as I will examine in
the next chapter.

3.2.2 The Cue-Utilization View
Various modern frameworks of how metacognitive judgements are made put emphasis on the
involvement of factors outside of the learning material itself as cues to infer the degree of
learning. For example, Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization framework (see also Dunlosky &
Metcalfe, 2009; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996) postulates that when making metacognitive judgments,
learners incorporate extrinsic cues that pertain to the condition of learning and beliefs associated
with them (e.g., the belief that items that were studied twice are more memorable than items that
were studied once), in addition to intrinsic cues that are unique to the learning material (e.g., the
difficulty of learning a particular item) and mnemonic cues that were experienced by the learners
themselves (e.g., retrieval fluency). In line with this view and as briefly described earlier, a
literature on the effect of the font-size manipulation on word-list learning and metacognition
showed that learners gave higher ratings on judgments of learning (JOLs: post-learning
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prediction on later test performance) for the words that were presented in a larger font than a
smaller font. This is because words in a larger font are processed more rapidly (i.e., increased
perceptual fluency) and/or people have a belief that larger fonts are better for learning, and these
types of information are used as cues in making inference on the degree of learning.
The results from the previous experiments clearly supported this view in that all studies
showed that participants gave a higher CLJ ratings for categories that were presented in the large
than the small size despite the actual performance was better for the categories that were
presented in the small size. However, whether this effect applies to other situations, as will be
investigated in the next chapter, is unclear. Specifically, does this effect extend to categories
other than fish and when the category structure is designed so that the large-picture size produces
better learning? On the one hand, it is possible that the utilization of the extrinsic and mnemonic
cues, such as the perceptual fluency and the belief associated with the large-picture size, continue
to influence CLJs even when the actual performance is better for the large size. If that is the case,
the CLJ ratings will be higher for the large size above and beyond the degree of the final test
performance. On the other hand, it is also possible that when these cues and the actual
performance point to the same direction, their effects will be sub-additive, so that CLJ ratings
will not significantly differ from the classification performance.
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Chapter 4: Current Experiments
To reiterate, the core idea of the current experiments is to test the unique predictions made by the
perceptual precedence hypothesis and the increased effort hypothesis regarding the smallpicture-size advantage in category learning. All participants in the following two experiments
will study half of the example pictures in the small and the other half in the large size. Critically,
they will be randomly assigned to study a category structure with different types of diagnostic
dimensions; in each experiment, one group of participants will study a category structure in
which a local dimension(s) is diagnostic while another group of participants will study a category
structure in which a global dimension is diagnostic2. I attempted to demonstrate the generality of
the hypothesized findings by testing categories across two classes: animate (fish and tern) and
inanimate (orchid and rocks). This is because people process animate and inanimate objects
differently (e.g., animate pictures are remembered better: Bonin, Gelin, & Bugaiska, 2014; see
Nairne, VanArsdall, & Cogdill, 2017 for a review), and thus category learning involving these
classes of objects could be qualitatively different. As outlined above, the perceptual precedence
hypothesis predicts that the small-picture-size advantage to emerge when the categories are
defined by a global dimension, but it also predicts a large-picture-size advantage to emerge when
the categories are defined by a local dimension(s). On the contrary, the increased effort
hypothesis predicts that the small-picture size should enhance learning regardless of the globality
of the diagnostic dimension(s).
2

I initially attempted to examine the same hypotheses by using artificial fish category structures created by
combining the shapes and patterns of different fish in which the diagnostic dimension was either global (Experiment
1: exterior shape; Experiment 2: pattern on the body) or local dimension (Experiment 1: the shape of the caudal fin;
Experiment 2: the pattern on the caudal fin; see Appendices A and B for these materials and brief descriptions of the
results). However, several pilot studies failed to show the picture-size effect, and thus I decided on using the
naturalistic stimuli as presented here.

32

Four natural category structures (animate-global diagnostic, animate-local diagnostic,
inanimate-global diagnostic, and inanimate-local diagnostic) were carefully assembled to serve
as the learning material for the current experiments. In addition to the fish categories which will
be studied in the animate-global diagnostic condition, I attempted to identify three more natural
category structures with the most desired distribution of diagnosticity across their dimensions
(i.e., a clear global or local diagnostic dimension or dimensions) by consulting classification
experts in the field who had intimate knowledge of how visual classification was made in a given
domain.
First, in order to identify an animate category structure with a local diagnostic dimension,
I contacted dozens of biological scientists specialized in animal behavior and classification. Of
whom, Dr. Zuleyma Tang-Martinez3, a professor emeritus in the Biology Department of
University of Missouri, St. Louis, and an animal behavior expert, gave me the most helpful
information. She pointed out that the exterior shape is diagnostic in most animal classification,
but some species of terns look very similar in shape and the details expressed in certain parts of
their body (i.e., forehead, bill, legs, the shape of the back of the head) determine the
categorization. Figure 15 shows a few examples of the tern categories included in the current
experiment. Although they appear very similar at a glance, local features define each category;
Aleutian terns are primarily identified by the white patch on the forehead, elegant terns by the
elongated feathers on the back of the head, Forster’s terns by the black tip on a beak, and arctic
terns by not having these features.
Figure 15. Examples of the tern categories that were used in Experiment 1 in which local features (e.g.,
beak, forehead, back of the head) are diagnostic.

3

https://www.umsl.edu/~biology/About%20the%20Department/Faculty/tang.html
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For the inanimate category structure with a global diagnostic dimension, I contacted
scientists specialized in plant biology and identification. Of whom, Dr. Peter Bernhardt4, a
professor in the Department of Biology at St. Louis University, and a pollination biology expert,

4

https://www.slu.edu/arts-and-sciences/biology/faculty/bernhardt-peter.php
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pointed to some hybrid orchid species among which visual classifications are primarily made
according to their exterior shape5. Figure 19 shows the orchid stimuli. Note that as these are
hybrid species, the color and pattern vary widely among the instances within a category, making
the exterior shape the primary diagnostic dimension.
Finally, for the inanimate category structure with a local diagnostic feature, I chose rock
categories with which I have previously conducted several studies (e.g., Miyatsu, et al., 2019;
Miyatsu, et al., in press). Rock categories are complex natural categories that have many
dimensions as identified by computational modeling based on similarity rating, and learners
seem to use all these dimensions to classify new instances (e.g., Nosofsky, et al., 2017;
Nosofsky, Sanders, Meagher, & Douglas, 2018). However, the classification scheme provided by
geo-science experts (e.g., Miyatsu, et al., 2019) indicated that the most prominent diagnostic
dimensions are color, grain-size, and texture. One may consider these dimensions as global
because these dimensions are often expressed throughout a rock. However, information
represented in these dimensions is highly consistent across a stimulus. That is, any small part of a
rock would look very similar to other small parts from the same rock, and only a small part of a
rock needs to be encoded in detail to extract that the rock has small grains or glossy texture.
Thus, I consider these dimensions to be local in the current framework.

5

He also pointed out that the shape of the sexual organs can be diagnostic in these species, but these organs are
often concealed and not readily visible in a single, front-view picture.
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4.1 Experiment 1
4.1.1 Method
Design. A 2 x 2 mixed-factorial design, with the size of the example pictures (small or large)
being the within-subjects variable and the categories to be learned (fish or tern) being the
between-subjects variable, was employed.
Participants. Sixty undergraduates from Washington University in St. Louis (30 each in
the local and the global diagnostic conditions; 57% female, Mage = 20.0) participated in each
experiment. The sample size was determined by a priori power analysis to give me an extremely
high power (.99) to detect a medium size main effect of the size manipulation (f = 0.31, r = .44)6
as well as a high power (.95) to detect a medium size interaction (f = .25) and an adequate power
(.82) to detect a medium-small interaction (f = .20).
Materials. The material was 100 tropical fish pictures (10 examples each for 10
categories) and 100 tern pictures7. Figures 16 and 17 show the pictures of fish and terns used in
Experiment 1. The fish pictures were taken from the previous experiments dealing with familylevel classification. The tern pictures were assembled through a web search according to the
information provided by the animal classification expert as described above. All pictures were
scaled similarly and pasted on a white background.
Figure 16. Examples of the fish stimuli that were used in Experiment 1. Each row represents a category
(i.e., species).

6

The effect size and the correlation between the performance on small and large items were calculated by metaanalyzing data from the previous experiments.
7
A high-resolution version of all the pictures used in the current experiments and the previous experiments as well
as data from all of these experiments can be accessed at Open Science Framework at osf.io/r6k4t
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Figure 17. Examples of the tern stimuli that were used in Experiment 1. Each row represents a category
(i.e., species).
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Procedure. First, all participants were seated in front of a computer and asked not to
change posture drastically for the entire duration of the experiment, such as putting the legs on
the table or get closer to the screen to see the details of small pictures, because these actions can
compromise the intended visual angle at which the presented pictures are encoded. And then, the
participants studied ten categories of fish or tern by observing six examples from each category
one by one for 5 seconds each. For each participant, six training examples out of ten available
examples from each category were randomly chosen, and the reminding four examples served as
the test items. The example pictures from half of the categories were presented in a small size
(about 2 degree of visual angle: a fish or a tern picture of 1 inch in width viewed from 30 inches)
whereas the other half were presented in a large size (about 19 degree of visual angle: a fish or a
tern picture of 10 inches in width viewed from 30 inches). The assignment of each category to
the small or the large size were counterbalanced so that each category was presented in the small
and the large size equally often. The pictures were presented in a block-randomized interleaved
sequence, such that each block consisted of an example from each of the ten categories in a
random order uniquely created for each participant. Upon studying the sixth and last example
from each category, the participants were asked to make category learning judgments (CLJs) by
answering the following question on a scale of 0 to 100: On a scale of 0 to 100, how confident
are you that you will be able to correctly categorize a new member of this particular category
38

during a later test? After studying and making the CLJs for all ten categories, the participants
played tetris for 3 minutes as a distractor task. The participants then completed the final test in
which they were presented with 40 new pictures, four pictures each from the ten categories, in a
neutral size (about 11º) and were asked to classify them by clicking one of the ten options
labeled with the names of the ten learned categories. The order of the final test was blockrandomized, such that each of the four test blocks consisted of one example from each of the ten
categories. The participants were given 10 seconds for each test trial. Finally, the participants
were asked which picture size they thought helped them learn the categories better before being
debriefed and left the laboratory.

4.1.2 Results
Classification performance. The top-left panel of Figure 18 shows participants’ mean
performances on the final test according to their conditions.
Figure 18. Participants’ mean classification performance (top-left panel), mean CLJ ratings (top-right
panel), and post-experimental judgement on which picture size they learned better from (bottom panels),
from Experiment 1. The error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
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A 2 X 2 mixed factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the picture size (small or large) as
the within-subjects variable and the condition (fish or tern) as the between-subjects variable, was
conducted on these data. Neither the main effect of picture size, F(1, 58) = 2.39, p > .05, ηp2 =
.04, nor the main effect of condition, F(1, 58) = 0.44, p > .05, ηp2 = .01, was significant.
However, there was a significant interaction between these two variables, F(1, 58) = 19.37, p <
.001, ηp2 = .25. Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests showed that the participants in the fish condition
performed significantly better in small (M = .42, SD = .23) compared to large pictures (M = .36,
SD = .19), t(29) = 2.65, p < .05, d = 0.50. Twenty-one out of 30 participants showed this smallpicture-size advantage. On the contrary, the participants in the tern condition performed better in
large (M = .42, SD = .20) compared to small (M = .30, SD = .18) pictures, t(29) = 3.53, p < .01, d
= 0.64. Also, 21 out of 30 participants showed this large-picture-size advantage.
Category learning judgments (CLJs). The accuracy of CLJs was assessed in three
ways. First, the participants’ sensitivity to the size manipulation and the category structure (i.e.,
fish or tern condition) was assessed by a size-by-condition mixed-ANOVA to see if the pattern
lined up with the same analyses performed on the classification performance. Second, the match
between the patterns of results from classification performance and CLJs in each condition was
assessed by separate size-by-outcome (i.e., classification or CLJ) within-subjects ANOVAs8 for
the fish and the tern condition. Third, monitoring resolution was assessed by computing mean
within-participant gamma correlation between CLJs and classification performance for each
category (Wahlheim, Dunlosky, & Jacoby, 2011). In essence, Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma is
preferred over other approaches (e.g., Pearson product-moment correlation) in this and other
situations dealing with similar metacognitive judgements, such as judgments of learning (JOLs;
8

The CLJ ratings, which were given in the scale of 0 to 100, were divided by 100 in this analysis to match the scale
with the classification performance.
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e.g., Nelson, & Dunlosky, 1991) and feeling of knowing (FOKs; e.g., Metcalfe, 1986) because
the gamma correlation is a rank correlation, and as such it is immune to the effect from some
participants using the rating scale differently from others (e.g., liberal or conservative use of the
upper or the lower range; see also Nelson, 1984).
The top-right panel of Figure 18 shows participants’ mean performance prediction (CLJs)
according to their conditions. A 2 X 2 mixed factorial ANOVA, with the picture size (small or
large) as the within-subjects variable and the condition (fish or tern) as the between-subjects
variable, was conducted on these data. There was a significant main effect of picture size, such
that categories presented in the large size were judged to be learned better, F(1, 58) = 23.31, p <
.001, ηp2 = .29, but the main effect of condition was not significant, F(1, 58) = 3.42, p > .05, ηp2
= .06. In addition, there was a significant interaction between these two variables, F(1, 58) =
5.66, p < .05, ηp2 = .09. A glance at the means shows that the participants gave higher CLJ
ratings for large than small pictures in both fish (large: M = 65.90, SD = 17.97 vs small: M =
60.80, SD = 17.37) and tern conditions (large: M = 61.99, SD = 22.35 vs small: M = 46.99, SD =
22.62). Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests showed that while this difference was only marginally
significant in the fish condition, t(29) = 1.74, p < .10, d = 0.32, it was fully significant in the tern
condition, t(29) = 5.08, p < .001, d = 0.93. Seventeen out of 30 participants in the fish condition
and 25 out of 30 participants in the tern condition gave higher CLJ ratings for large pictures.
A 2 X 2 within-subjects factorial ANOVA, with the picture size (small or large) and the
outcome (classification or CLJs) as the independent variables, was conducted separately for the
fish and the tern conditions. For the fish condition, the main effect of picture size was not
significant, F(1, 29) < 1, p > .05, ηp2 = .00, but the main effect of outcome was significant, such
that the participants gave higher CLJ ratings (M = .63, SD = .22) than the actual classification
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performance (M = .39, SD = .29), F(1, 29) = 59.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .67. In addition, there was a
significant interaction between these two variables, F(1, 29) = 8.01, p < .01, ηp2 = .22. For the
tern condition, there was a significant main effect of picture size, such that the average of the
classification performance and the CLJ ratings were higher for the large (M = .52, SD = .26)
compared to the small pictures (M = .38, SD = .25), F(1, 29) = 23.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .44, as well
as a significant main effect of outcome, such that the participants gave higher CLJ ratings (M =
.55, SD = .29) than the actual classification performance (M = .36, SD = .23), F(1, 29) = 26.89, p
< .001, ηp2 = .48. Importantly, the interaction between these two variables was not significant,
F(1, 29) < 1, p > .05, ηp2 = .03, indicating that the degree to which the participants assigned
higher CLJ ratings for large pictures did not exceed the degree to which they performed better in
large pictures.
The average gamma correlation between participants’ CLJs for each category and the
corresponding classification performance was .35 (SD = .38). A one-sample t-test indicated that
it was significantly above chance, t(59) = 7.12, p < .001, d = 0.93. An independent-sample t-test
indicated that the degree of gamma correlation did not differ between the fish (M = .35, SD =
.37) and the tern conditions (M = .35, SD = .40), t(59) = 0.02, p > .05, d = 0.00.
The post-experimental question. The bottom panels of Figure 18 show the number of
participants who claimed to have learned better from large pictures, small pictures, or both the
same, in the fish and the tern conditions respectively. In the fish condition, 20 participants
claimed to have learned better from the large pictures, 10 participants claimed that there was no
difference between the small and the large pictures, and 0 participant claimed that they have
learned better from the small pictures. In the tern condition, 28 participants claimed to have
learned better from the large pictures, 2 participants claimed that there was no difference
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between the small and the large pictures, and 0 participant claimed that they have learned better
from the small pictures.

4.1.3 Discussion
To begin, in line with both the perceptual precedence and the increased effort hypotheses, the
small-picture-size advantage in the classification of the fish categories was replicated.
Importantly, however, in line with the perceptual precedence hypothesis but not with the
increased effort hypothesis, there was a large-picture-size advantage in the tern condition. Before
I discuss the implications of this critical interaction, I will present another experiment dealing
with inanimate categories to assess the generality of this finding. As described before, prior
research has shown that people process animate objects differently from inanimate objects (e.g.,
Bonin, et al., 2014; Nairne, et al., 2017), and thus it is possible that this pattern of results is
restricted to animate categories.
The results from the metacognitive measures replicated some key findings in the
literature and extended them further. In the fish condition, a large-picture-size bias akin to the
font-size bias in word-list learning (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2008) was observed; the participants
gave higher CLJ ratings for the categories that were presented in the large size despite the small
size being better for actual learning. Further, similar to Kornell and Bjork’s (2008) study
investigating the effect of interleaving and blocking, the participants in the fish condition also
reported that they learned better from the large pictures after the final test despite many of them
actually performing better in the small pictures. After several replications of this effect in the
previous experiments, it is still stunning that none of the 21 participants who actually performed
better in the small pictures in the fish condition (the blue part of the bars in the bottom-left panel
of Figure 18) believed that small pictures were better for learning the categories. In the tern
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condition, the participants also claimed to have learned better from the large pictures both after
learning (i.e., CLJ) and after the final test (i.e., the post-experimental question). However, unlike
the fish condition, these metacognitive assessments were in line with the actual performance
because the tern categories were learned better in the large size. Interestingly, the non-significant
size-by-outcome interaction in the within-subjects ANOVA run separately for the tern condition
indicated that the pattern of results did not differ between the classification performance and
CLJs in this condition. That is, the degree to which the participants assigned higher CLJ ratings
to large pictures did not exceed the degree of the large-picture-size advantage in the actual
learning.
Despite the illusory prediction in the fish condition that the large pictures were better for
learning, CLJ clearly had predictive validity as demonstrated by its above-chance average
within-participant Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma correlation. The overall gamma of .35 was
comparable to the previous studies using naturalistic categories and CLJs (Jacoby, et al., 2010:
range: .31-.33; Wahlheim, et al., 2011: range: .47-.49) as well as the same measure computed
from the data from the previous experiments (range: .33-.38) and indicated that the participants’
CLJs were sensitive to the difference in difficulty of learning each category.
In sum, the classification performance showed the category-structure-specific small- and
large- picture-size advantage, providing a preliminary support for the perceptual precedence
hypothesis. In addition, in line with the cue-utilization view, persisting metacognitive illusion
was observed through CLJs and the post-experimental question in one condition; the participants
in the fish condition claimed to have learned better from the large pictures both before and after
the final classification test. However, in line with the direct access and retrieval view, some
degree of metacognitive accuracy was also demonstrated; the participants in the tern condition
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correctly claimed to have learned better from large pictures both in CLJs and in the postexperimental question, and CLJs predicted the actual performance at a rate that was well-above
the chance.

4.2 Experiment 2
4.2.1 Method
Design. A 2 x 2 mixed-factorial design, with the size of the example pictures (small or large)
being the within-subjects variable and the categories to be learned (orchid categories with global
diagnostic dimension or rock categories with local diagnostic dimension) being the betweensubjects variable, was employed.
Participants. Sixty undergraduates from Washington University in St. Louis (30 each in
the local and the global conditions; 62% female, Mage = 20.1) participated in each experiment.
Materials. The material was 120 (10 examples each for 12 categories) orchid pictures
and 120 rock pictures. The orchid pictures were assembled through a web search according to the
guidance provided by a plant biology expert as described above. The rock pictures were taken
from previous studies dealing with rock classification (Miyatsu, et al., 2019; Miyatsu, et al., in
press). All pictures were scaled similarly and pasted on a white background. Figure 19 and 20
show the pictures of orchid and rocks used in Experiment 1.
Figure 19. Examples of the orchid stimuli that were used in Experiment 2 in which the exterior shape is
the primary diagnostic dimension. Each row represents a category (i.e., species).
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Figure 20. Examples of the rock stimuli that were used in Experiment 2. Each row represents a category
(i.e., species).
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Procedure. Experiment 2 procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except the
participants learned orchid or rock categories instead of fish or terns, and the total number of
categories in each condition was 10 instead of 12.

4.2.2 Results
Classification performance. The top-left panel of Figure 21 shows participants’ mean
performances on the final test according to their conditions.
Figure 21. Participants’ mean classification performance (top-left panel), mean CLJ ratings (top-right
panel), and post-experimental judgement on which picture size they learned better from (bottom panels),
from Experiment 2. The error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
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A 2 X 2 mixed factorial ANOVA, with the picture size (small or large) as the within-subjects
variable and the condition (orchid or rock) as the between-subjects variable, was conducted on
these data. There was a significant main effect of picture size, such that categories presented in
the large size were learned better, F(1, 58) = 6.63, p < .05, ηp2 = .10, as well as a significant
main effect of condition, such that the participants in the rock classification condition performed
better than the ones in the orchid classification condition, F(1, 58) = 16.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .23.
However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between the two
variables, F(1, 58) = 10.72, p < .01, ηp2 = .16. Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests showed that the
participants in the orchid condition performed similarly in small (M = .45, SD = .17) and large
(M = .43, SD = .18) pictures, t(29) = .54, p > .05, d = 0.13. In contrast, the participants in the
rock condition performed better in large (M = .69, SD = .18) compared to small (M = .56, SD =
.22) pictures, t(29) = 3.84, p < .01, d = 0.72. Nineteen out of 30 participants in the orchid
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condition performed better in small pictures while 22 out of 30 participants in the rock condition
performed better in large pictures.
Category learning judgments (CLJs). The top-right panel of Figure 21 shows
participants’ mean performance prediction (CLJs) according to their conditions. A 2 X 2 mixed
factorial ANOVA, with the picture size (small or large) as the within-subjects variable and the
condition (orchid or rock) as the between-subjects variable, was conducted on these data. There
was a significant main effect of picture size, such that categories presented in the large size were
judged to be learned better, F(1, 58) = 34.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, as well as a significant main
effect of condition, such that the participants in the rock condition gave higher CLJ ratings than
the ones in the orchid condition, F(1, 58) = 7.10, p < .01, ηp2 = .11. However, these main effects
were qualified by a significant interaction between the two variables, F(1, 58) = 11.98, p < .01,
ηp2 = .17. Similarly to Experiment 1, a glance at the means shows that the participants gave
higher CLJ ratings for large than small pictures in both orchid (large: M = 56.36, SD = 19.63 vs
small: M = 52.25, SD = 20.15) and rock conditions (large: M = 74.23, SD = 13.53 vs small: M =
58.48, SD = 20.57). Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests showed that while this difference was only
marginally significant in the orchid condition, t(29) = 1.94, p < .10, d = 0.35, it was fully
significant in the rock condition, t(29) = 6.02, p < .001, d = 1.10. Sixteen out of 30 participants in
the orchid condition and 27 out of 30 participants in the rock condition gave higher CLJ rating
for categories that were presented in large pictures.
A 2 X 2 within-subjects factorial ANOVA, with the picture size (small or large) and the
outcome (classification or CLJs) as the independent variables, was conducted separately for the
fish and the tern conditions. For the orchid condition, the main effect of picture size was not
significant, F(1, 29) < 1, p > .05, ηp2 = .01, but the main effect of outcome was significant, such
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that the participants gave higher CLJ ratings (M = .54, SD = .27) than the actual classification
performance (M = .44, SD = .22), F(1, 29) = 8.45, p < .01, ηp2 = .23. In addition, there was a
significant interaction between these two variables, F(1, 29) = 4.59, p < .05, ηp2 = .14. Post-hoc
paired-samples t-tests showed that while the classification performance did not differ between
small and large pictures (small: M = .45, SD = .17 vs large: M = .43, SD = .18), t(29) = 0.54, p >
.05, d = 0.13, the CLJ ratings showed a marginally significant large-size bias (small: M = .52, SD
= .20 vs large: M = .56, SD = .20), t(29) = 1.94, p = .06, d = 0.34. For the rock condition, there
was a significant main effect of picture size, such that the average of the classification
performance and the CLJ ratings were higher for the large (M = .71, SD = .19) compared to the
small pictures (M = .57, SD = .28), F(1, 29) = 31.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .52, but the main effect of
outcome did not reach significance, F(1, 29) = 2.56, p = .12, ηp2 = .08. Importantly, the
interaction between these two variables was not significant, F(1, 29) < 1, p > .05, ηp2 = .03,
indicating that the degree to which the participants assigned higher CLJ ratings for large pictures
did not exceed the degree to which they performed better in large pictures.
The average gamma correlation between participants’ CLJs for each category and the
corresponding classification performance was .42 (SD = .33). A one-sample t-test indicated that
it was significantly above chance, t(59) = 9.95, p < .001, d = 1.28. An independent-sample t-test
indicated that the degree of gamma correlation did not differ between the orchid (M = .38, SD =
.33) and the rock conditions (M = .46, SD = .33), t(59) = 0.96, p > .05, d = 0.25.
The post-experimental question. The bottom panels of Figures 21 show the number of
participants who claimed to have learned better from large pictures, small pictures, or both the
same, in the orchid and the rock conditions respectively. In the orchid condition, 17 participants
claimed to have learned better from the large pictures, 7 participants claimed that there was no
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difference between the small and the large pictures, and 6 participants claimed that they have
learned better from the small pictures. In the rock condition, 22 participants claimed to have
learned better from the large pictures, 8 participants claimed that there was no difference
between the small and the large pictures, and 0 participant claimed that they have learned better
from the small pictures.

4.2.3 Discussion
Similarly to Experiment 1 using the animate categories, the data from the classification
performance showed the critical interaction between the picture size and the category structure
(i.e., global or local diagnostic) demonstrating that the effect of the picture-size manipulation
depends on the category structure to be learned. However, unlike the cross-over interaction from
Experiment 1, there was no statistically significant difference between the small- and the largepicture size in the global diagnostic condition (i.e., orchid). Thus, the current experiment failed
to extend the small-picture-size advantage to a category other than fish.
Despite the lack of the small-picture-size advantage for the orchid condition, the
metacognitive illusion was extended to a different class of category structure (inanimate).
Participants in the orchid condition gave marginally higher CLJ ratings on average to the
categories presented in the large size comparted to the ones presented in the small size although
there was no difference in the actual performance between the large and the small size.
Replicating the results from Experiment 1, the participants’ CLJ ratings were mostly in line with
their actual performance in the local-diagnostic (i.e., rock) condition. The non-significant sizeby-outcome interaction in the separate within-subjects ANOVA for the rock condition indicated
that, again, the degree to which the participants assigned higher CLJ ratings to large pictures did
not exceed the degree of the large-picture-size advantage in the actual learning.
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Despite the illusory performance prediction regarding the picture size in the orchid
condition, CLJs once again showed its predictive validity. The overall gamma of .42 was above
chance and comparable to that of Experiment 1 (.35), the previous experiments (range: .33-.38),
and the previous studies of similar nature (Jacoby, et al., 2010: range: .31-.33; Wahlheim, et al.,
2011: range: .47-.49).

4.2.4 Supplemental Analyses on the Sources of the Metacognitive Illusion
Before discussing the implications of the above findings in the next chapter, I will present
supplemental analyses combining Experiments 1 and 2 as well as the previous Experiments 1
through 5 that could inform the sources of the large-picture-size bias in category learning
judgment (CLJs: post-learning performance prediction). This metacognitive illusion parallels
with the font-size illusion (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2008) wherein learners gave higher ratings in
judgements of learning (JOLs: post-learning performance prediction in word-list learning) for
words presented in a large compared to a small font despite there was no difference in the actual
memory test performance. As developed in the introduction briefly, there are two camps in
conceptualizing the font-size bias arguing about the degree of contributions from two sources:
belief and fluency. On the one hand, researchers have argued that this font-size bias arises
because learners have a general belief that large fonts are better for learning and that belief is
reflected in the higher JOL ratings for words presented in a lager font (e.g., Mueller, et al., 2014).
On the other hand, researchers have argued that the font-size bias manifests because words in a
larger font are processed more quickly, and this fluency is attributed as a sign of learning when
making JOLs (e.g., Rhodes & Castel, 2008). Importantly, some researchers in the belief camp
claim that the belief is the primary source of the font-size bias and there is little contribution
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from fluency (e.g., Mueller, et al., 2014) whereas the fluency camp acknowledges the
contribution from belief but still argues that fluency contributes to this effect (e.g., Price,
McElroy, & Martin, 2016). Given the similarity between the font-size bias and the large-picturesize bias, as well as the plausibility of belief and fluency as the sources of the large-picture-size
bias, I will present below analyses aimed at assessing the contribution from these two sources in
the large-picture-size bias observed in the current experiments (in the fish and orchid conditions)
and the previous experiments.
Contribution from belief – large-picture-size bias plotted by post-experimental
belief. Many participants in the current and the previous experiments held the belief that the
large pictures were better for learning categories at least after the experiment as indicated by the
post-experimental question. One might wonder how well this post-experimental belief aligned
with the pre-existing belief the participants held when they made CLJs. Theoretically, the postexperimental belief is a combination of the pre-existing belief and the belief that arose from the
experience during the experiment. However, an analysis of the literature on this issue suggests
that the post-experimental belief predominantly reflects the pre-existing belief. First, experiencebased modification of belief is difficult such that learners are often unable to mend metacognitive
illusions just by going through learning and test (e.g., Koriat, & Bjork, 2006). Second, the
ineffectiveness of this purely experience-based de-biasing (as opposed to theory-based debiasing in which participants are told that one method of studying is more effective than others)
has also been demonstrated in a category learning study that is very similar to the current study
(Yan, Bjork, & Bjork, 2016). Thus, it seems reasonable to use the post-experimental question in
the current and the previous experiments as a proxy of the pre-existing belief that was held at the
time of CLJs and see if the large-picture-size bias differs as a function of that belief.
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In the post-experimental question, participants indicated whether they believed that the
large pictures were better for learning, small pictures were better for learning, or both the same.
If these beliefs contributed to the way the participants made CLJs, there should be greater largepicture-size bias (i.e., M

large

– M

small)

among the “believers” who indicated that the large

pictures were better for learning than the “non-believers” who indicated that the small pictures
were better or both the same. Figure 22 shows the average large-picture-size bias as a function of
the belief in the fish and the orchid conditions from Experiments 1 and 2.
Figure 22. Participants’ mean bias score on CLJs from the fish and orchid conditions in Experiments 1
and 2 plotted by a function of post-experimental belief.

An independent-sample t-test showed that the mean bias score of the believers (M = 8.54, SD =
14.49) was indeed higher than that of the non-believers (M = -1.72, SD = 10.29), t(58) = 2.96, p
< .01, d = 0.82. Interestingly, as you can see on Figure 23, this pattern did not hold up for the
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tern and the rock conditions from Experiments 1 and 2 where large pictures also produced better
learning.
Figure 23. Participants’ mean bias score on CLJs from the tern and rock conditions in Experiments 1 and
2 plotted by a function of post-experimental belief. Note that there were no participants in these
conditions who believed that small pictures were better for learning, and thus that box could not be
plotted.

An independent-sample t-test showed that the mean bias score of the believers (M = 15.19, SD =
15.32) was not significantly different from that of the non-believers in these conditions (M =
16.28, SD = 15.12), t(58) = 0.21, p > .05, d = 0.07. However, as you can see on Figure 24, this
pattern of results held up when the same analysis was applied to the previous Experiments 1
through 5 in which all conditions showed statistically significant or numerical small-picture-size
advantage in the classification performance.
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Figure 24. Participants’ mean bias score on CLJs from the previous Experiments 1 through 5 plotted by a
function of post-experimental belief.

An independent-sample t-test showed that the mean bias score of the believers (M = 12.36, SD =
15.25) was again higher than that of the non-believers (M = 3.73, SD = 14.41), t(401) = 5.69, p <
.001, d = 0.79. Thus, both in the current experiments and in the previous experiments, the belief
contributed to the large-picture-size bias, higher CLJ ratings given to categories presented in the
large compared to the small size, when small pictures produced better learning.
Did the large pictures produce increased fluency compared to the small pictures?9
As the reaction time is the primary measure of fluency, one may expect a faster reaction time to
CLJ trials for categories presented in the large compared to the small size if the large pictures
indeed produced a greater fluency. Interestingly, this prediction did not pan out neither in the
current experiments nor in the previous experiments. In the current experiments, there was no

9

In the analyses involving the reaction time measure reported in this and the following section, the reaction time for
each trial was standardized at the participant level, and the trials with a z-score of less than -3 and greater than 3
were excluded from the analyses.
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statistically significant difference between the small pictures (M = 8648.15, SD = 2221.08) and
the large pictures (M = 8764.32, SD = 2882.53), t(119) = 0.42, p > .05, d = 0.05. In the previous
experiments, participants’ reaction time for CLJ trials were actually faster for the small pictures
(M = 8667.62, SD = 2485.02) than for the large pictures (M = 9079.52, SD = 4094.23), t(401) =
2.75, p < .01, d = 0.12.
Was there a relationship between fluency and CLJ ratings at all? Increased fluency
(measure by faster reaction time) has been associated with greater ratings on various kinds of
metacognitive judgements (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009 for review), and thus it is possible
that it also affected participants’ CLJ ratings in the current and the previous experiments. To test
this prediction, Pearson product-moment correlation between CLJ ratings and the reaction time
for these CLJ trials was computed. There was a small but significant negative correlation
between the two variables both in the current experiments, r(1307) = -.072, p < .01 (Experiment
1: -.032; Experiment 2: -.174), and in the previous experiments, r(4822) = -.036, p < .05 (range: .106-.005). These analyses showed that increased fluency was associated with greater CLJ
ratings. However, this is likely a different type of fluency than the perceptual fluency (i.e., the
speed at which a picture is processed) as I will discuss more in the following chapter.

Chapter 5: General Discussion
5.1 The Picture-Size Effect on Category Learning
In the current dissertation, I investigated the mechanism through which the small-picture-size
advantage on category learning manifested. The current experiments not only replicated the
effect (Experiment 1 fish condition) but also showed a large-picture-size advantage in some
conditions (Experiment 1 tern condition & Experiment 2 rock condition). Along with the
57

previous experiments, these are the first empirical demonstrations of how a simple perceptual
manipulation of picture size affects learning of complex natural categories. Critically, there was
a significant interaction between the picture size and the category structure (local or global
diagnostic dimensions), such that small pictures produced better learning only when a global
dimension was diagnostic of the category structure whereas large pictures were superior when
local dimensions were diagnostic. In addition, this critical interaction was observed across two
important classes of natural categories (Experiment 1: animate; Experiment 2: inanimate).
In Chapter 3, I sketched out two potential hypotheses regarding the picture-size effect on
category learning: the increased effort hypothesis and the perceptual precedence hypothesis. The
findings enumerated above are inconsistent with the increased effort hypothesis which assumed a
category-structure-general mechanism. Specifically, it predicted that the small-picture size to be
superior regardless of the globality of diagnostic dimensions of a given category structure. Under
this hypothesis, a large-picture-size advantage should occur in no situation. On the contrary, the
large-picture-size advantage found in the tern and the rock conditions, as well as the critical sizeby-category interaction observed in both Experiments 1 and 2, supported the perceptual
precedence hypothesis and demonstrated that a category-structure-specific mechanism underlies
the picture-size effect on category learning. However, the results posed some challenges to the
perceptual precedence hypothesis as will be discussed later; The small-picture-size advantage
was not observed in the orchid condition in Experiment 2, and as a result, the interaction pattern
was not a full crossover as anticipated by the hypothesis.
The category-structure-specific nature of the picture-size effect is in line with the
material-appropriate-processing framework (MAP: Einstein, McDaniel, Owen, & Cote, 1990;
McDaniel, & Einstein, 1989) which was developed in the text and the word-list learning
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research. In general terms, MAP postulates that the efficacy of a given manipulation depends on
the material to which it is applied. A framework akin to MAP in the context of category learning,
category-appropriate-processing framework (CAP) could be useful in conceptualizing
manipulations that can enhance category learning. The core idea of CAP is that the effectiveness
of a given manipulation to enhance category learning depends on the category structure to be
learned, and it emphasizes the importance of analyzing the match between the cognitive process
elicited by the manipulation and the processing that is beneficial to the given category structure.
This framework accommodates the present findings as well as several findings from recent
research. In the case of the current study, the encoding of instances in category learning can be
seen as a sequential encoding of various dimensions, and the first dimensions to be encoded vary
depending on the size manipulation: global dimensions first in the small pictures and local
dimensions first in the large pictures. Accordingly, the small-size manipulation enhanced
learning when the category structure had global diagnostic dimensions (the previous
Experiments 1-5 and the fish condition in the current experiments; but see the orchid condition),
and the large-size manipulation enhanced learning when the category structure had local
diagnostic dimensions (the tern and the rock conditions in the current experiments).
Diagnostic dimensions are not the only way to characterize category structures and to
determine the kind of processing that is beneficial. For example, in order to learn category
structures that are high in both within- and between- category similarity (i.e., instances belonging
to the same category look similar and the categories within the structure look similar), the
differences between categories need to be learned well. This is because why the instances belong
to the same category is clear (because they look similar) in this case but discriminating between
categories is challenging (because instances from different categories look similar). On the
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contrary, in order to learn category structures that are low in both within- and between- category
similarity (i.e., instances belonging to the same category look different and the categories within
the structure look different), the commonalities within each category need to be learned. This is
because why the instances belong to the same category is hard to grasp in this case (because they
look different) but discriminating between categories is easy (because instances from different
categories look different). Accordingly, interleaving (i.e., presenting examples from several
categories in succession to emphasize the processing of the differences between categories) has
been shown to enhance learning of many complex category structures with high within- and
between- category similarities (e.g., Kornell & Bjork, 2008), and blocking (i.e., presenting
examples form the same category consecutively to emphasize the processing of the similarity
within a category) has been shown to enhance learning of category structures with low withinand between- category similarities (e.g., Carvalho & Goldstone, 2014, 2015).
CAP can accommodate many other findings from the recent trend in the field of category
learning which identified factors that can enhance category learning as well. For instance, the
efficacy of specific-level training in teaching broad-level categories (e.g., in teaching broad-level
rock categories of igneous, sedimentary, and metamorphic, teaching the specific categories first,
such as andesite and obsidian under igneous, breccia and chert under sedimentary, and gneiss
and migmatite under metamorphic) has been shown to be dependent on the between-specificlevel category similarity (Miyatsu, et al., in press; Nosofsky, et al., 2017). Taking these findings
together (see also Pashler & Mozer, 2013, on the category-structure-specific nature of fading,
training that uses an exaggerated version of stimulus discrimination; Miyatsu et al., 2019,
Wahlheim, et al., 2012, for boundary category structure of the efficacy of exemplar variability),
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CAP postulates that the benefit of any manipulation on category learning depends on the
category structure to be learned.
It is important to note that the term “category structure” in the CAP framework is used in
the broadest sense. In the current study, category structures were characterized by their
dimensions and the diagnosticity of each dimension. I also provided above examples of how the
similarity at various levels (e.g., within- and between- category similarities) can be used to
characterize category structures. These and any other ways to characterize a category structure
by its distinctive properties should be considered when analyzing category structures in the CAP
framework. For example, in the classic category learning literature, category structures are often
characterized as either rule-based or information integration according to the presence (or
absence) of clear, verbalizable rules that can define the categorization (e.g., Ashby & Ell, 2001).
In general, CAP puts emphasis on analyzing the category structure and the cognitive processing
that is elicited by a manipulation of interest and has both theoretical and practical utility. For
example, CAP generates an interesting prediction that a similar category-structure-specific
process may be at play in other manipulations that are assumed to enhance category learning of
all category structures (e.g., test-enhanced learning: Jacoby, et al., 2010; see also the following
section on practical implications).
The current study is not without its limitations. The most prominent of which is the
failure to extend the small-picture-size advantage to categories other than fish. Despite the orchid
categories having the general characteristics that should be benefitted from the small-picture size
according to the perceptual precedence hypothesis (a global diagnostic dimension), there was no
small-picture-size advantage in this condition. There are a few possible related reasons for why
there was no small-picture-size advantage in the orchid condition. First the orchid categories are
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less complex than the fish categories (compare Figures 16 & 19). Specifically, there is a
considerably fewer number of dimensions in the orchid categories compared to the fish
categories. For example, while there are various physical characteristics of fish that vary from
instance to instance (i.e., dimensions), such as mouth, eye, six different kinds of fins, and pattern
that can vary depending on the part of the body, orchid flowers vary in just a few dimensions and
the color and pattern are mostly consistent throughout (see Figure 25 for schematic illustrations
of tropical fish and orchid flower demonstrating this difference in the anatomical complexities).
Figure 25. Schematic illustrations showing the anatomical complexity of tropical fish (top) and orchid
flower (bottom). Retrieved from www.fishlore.com and www.garden.org.
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Relatedly, while orchid flowers are symmetrical, fish have various features distributed
asymmetrically throughout. This difference makes the encoding of the orchid flowers less
complex because scanning of both sides of an orchid picture is not necessary. In contrast, the
presence of unique features in both the left-most (e.g., mouth, eye) and right-most part of the fish
(e.g., caudal fin) invites far more complex encoding involving sideways gaze shifts. Importantly,
the reduced complexity matters because the perceptual precedence hypothesis assumes an
encoding process in which a number of features compete for attention. When there are only a
few features to be encoded, despite the large-picture size initially guiding learners’ attention to
local dimensions like the shape of column in an orchid picture, learners could still encode the
rest of the features including the diagnostic feature of the exterior shape in the time given for a
study trial (5 seconds).
In addition, animate and inanimate objects have been shown to be processed differently,
and the processing difference might have prevented a small-picture-size advantage to manifest in
the orchid condition. Researchers have argued that human cognition is attuned to prioritize the
processing of animate over inanimate objects because animate objects have greater biological
and survival significance (see Nairne, et al., 2017 for review). For example, perceived animacy
both by the appearance or by motions of the objects have been shown to capture attention (e.g.,
Lipp, Derakshan, Waters, & Logies, 2004; Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & Abrams, 2010). People also
detect changes more quickly and accurately for animate compared to inanimate objects (New,
Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). However, the large-picture-size advantage was demonstrated in an
inanimate category structure (i.e., the rock condition), so animacy is not a strict boundary
condition for the picture-size effect per se. Nonetheless, it is possible that these processing
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differences contributed to the failure to obtain a small-picture-size advantage in the orchid
condition.
Related to the issues raised above, one way to summarize the results from the previous
and the current experiments is that small pictures significantly enhanced learning for only fish
categories. As contrasted against the orchid categories above, fish categories were complex,
asymmetrical, and animate, making them unique among all the categories in which the picturesize manipulation has been tested. In addition, people could have richer past experience with
fish, such as pets or food sources, or have greater prior knowledge on and association with fish
as this is a very common category in American (and other) culture. For example, one recent word
frequency norm in American English derived from 51 million words (SUBTLEX-US: Brysbaert,
New, & Keuleers, 2012) indicated that the word, fish (1138th most frequent, SUBTLWF10: 83.49),
has appeared more frequently than the words orchid (15172th, SUBTLWF: 2.16) or flower
(2646th, SUBTLWF: 22.76).

Careful considerations of these parameters can lead to an

identification of categories other than fish that would benefit from small pictures which is
paramount in demonstrating the generality of the picture-size effect as well as in advancing our
understanding of the picture-size-dependent attentional shift mechanism.

5.2 Alternative Accounts of the Picture-Size Effect
A part of the perceptual precedence hypothesis that has been implied throughout my description
of the proposed mechanism and deserves additional elaboration is the distraction view. Simply
put, this view considers the small-picture-size advantage as a large-picture-size disadvantage.
Specifically, performance was better in the small pictures in the fish experiments because the
large-picture size enhanced the extractability of local features that had little diagnostic value. The
10

SUBTLWF is the word frequency per million words.
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reverse is also true in that the distraction view considers the large-picture-size advantage in the
rock and tern conditions as a small-picture-size disadvantage. In these cases, performance was
better in in the large pictures because the small-picture size enhanced the extractability of global
features that had little diagnostic value.

It is important to note that the attentional shift

mechanism assumed in the perceptual precedence hypothesis hinges upon the relative
extractability of features. For example, if there were a local feature and a global feature and the
extractability of the local feature went up because of a size manipulation, extractability of the
global feature relative to the local feature would go down regardless of the effect of the size
manipulation to the global feature. Therefore, it is possible to explain the small-picture-size
advantage only by this distraction view. Whether the distraction-based mechanism accounts for
all of the picture-size effect or the emphasis of global diagnostic dimensions by the small-picture
size and the emphasis of local-diagnostic dimensions by the large-picture size accounts for some
of the effect is an empirical question. Regardless, these are descriptions of the two sides of the
same coin of the attentional shift that is assumed by the perceptual precedence hypothesis.
Another perspective of the picture-size effect that deserves a careful consideration is the
one based on spatial frequency. This point was also discussed by Kinchla and Wolf (1974) in
their original perceptual precedence theory, “…"most recognizable" forms11 may be thought of
in terms of size in the visual field or in terms of an optimal band of spatial frequencies” (p.230).
In the current study, the size manipulation led to a systematic change in the detectable spatial
frequency. Specifically, only the lower frequencies were visible in small pictures whereas the
higher frequencies were also visible in large pictures. Crucially, the analysis of the literature
concerning spatial frequency shows a striking resemblance to that of the size literature. First,
11

The word form means features expressed at different levels, such as the large letter and small letters in the global
precedence material shown in Figure 11.
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there is evidence for a top-down sequential processing like that of global precedence (Navon,
1977, 1981) but based on spatial frequency. For example, Schyns and Oliva (1994) reported that
in quickly recognizing complex scenes (e.g., a picture of highway), people rely first on coarse
scale represented by low spatial frequencies and then move on to fine spatial scales. Importantly
however, there is also a middle-out characteristic in human visual system concerning spatial
frequency. As Figure 26 shows, in experiment using grating patches, human visual system is
most sensitive to moderate spatial frequencies and the contrast sensitivity drops off for higher
and lower frequencies (Campbell & Maffei, 1974). Thus, it is possible that the attentional shift
between different features assumed by the current perceptual precedence hypothesis is based on
spatial frequency.
Figure 26. Contrast sensitivity of a human subject plotted as function of spatial frequency. The scales are
logarithmic. Very high contrast is given a value of 1, and contrast sensitivity is the reciprocal of contrast.
Reprinted from “Contrast and spatial frequency,” by Campbell, F. W., & Maffei, L. (1974), Scientific
American, 231(5), 106-115.
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It is also important to point out that the change in the extractability of different features
based on the change in spatial frequency is very similar to that based on the change in size.
Perhaps the most intuitive way of thinking about this is to draw a parallel between progressively
shrinking a picture and progressively blurring a picture (i.e., progressively removing lower and
lower spatial frequency components of an image). When only the highest frequencies are
removed (slightly blurred), fine details (i.e., local features) become unrecognizable first. In
contrast, global features (most global of which being the exterior shape) remain recognizable
much later in the blurring process when only lowest-frequency components are present. This is
very similar to how in a large size, all the fine details are available, but as the image becomes
smaller, the extraction of these details becomes more difficult and the extraction of global
features becomes easier. Thus, the spatial frequency perspective of the picture-size effect aligns
closely with the size perspective as articulated in the current perceptual precedence hypothesis.

5.3 The Picture-Size Effect on Metacognition
The current study was also the first to demonstrate the effect of the simple perceptual
manipulation of picture size on metacognition in the context of category learning. Category
learning judgement is clearly a valid measure of participants’ discriminative ability according to
their own learning. This was evident in the adequate level of the within-participant correlation
(i.e., gamma) between the CLJ ratings and the classification performance for particular
categories in the current experiments, the previous experiments, and the previous literature (e.g.,
Wahlheim, et al., 2011). Given this predictive validity of CLJs, the degree of the large-picturesize bias was surprising. In all conditions in the current and the previous experiments in which
small pictures produced significantly or numerically better classification performance (10
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conditions total), participants gave higher CLJ ratings on average to the categories that were
presented in the large compared to the small size.
However, as the direct access and retrieval view anticipated, participants’ CLJs appeared
to be accurate in some situations. In addition to the moderately high gamma correlations between
the CLJs and the classification performance reported above, the participants’ CLJs correctly
predicted the large-picture-size advantage in the tern and the rock conditions. Interestingly, the
non-significant size-by-outcome (classification or CLJs) interaction in these conditions indicated
that the degree to which the participants assigned higher CLJ ratings to the large pictures did not
exceed the degree of the large-picture-size advantage in the classification. Therefore, it appears
that the large-picture-size bias was not present when the direction of the bias aligned with the
condition that promoted better performance. Certainly, this lack of large-picture-bias when large
pictures produced better learning could represent a combination of an accurate assessment of
own learning and a successful prevention of the extrinsic and the mnemonic cues (e.g., the
processing fluency, the belief that large pictures are better for learning) to influence the inference
process. However, it is also possible that it represented a lack of an accurate assessment of own
learning and the persisting influence from the same extrinsic and mnemonic cues that caused the
large-picture-size bias when small pictures produced better learning. Although teasing apart the
influence from these cues is beyond the scope of the current study, the current results warrant
future investigations aimed at dissociating the contributions from different types of cues in
making the metacognitive judgments.
The current study also informed the sources of this metacognitive illusion and contributed
to the high-interest topic in the field (e.g., a forthcoming special issue on this topic at Zeitschrift
fur Psychologie) both empirically and methodologically. As mentioned before, the on-going
68

discussion in the field of the stimulus-size effect on metacognitive judgement is whether this
effect is underlie solely by the belief or both by the belief and the fluency. The supplemental
analyses plotting the mean bias score on CLJs (i.e., M large – M small) by the belief indexed by the
post-experimental question clearly showed that the belief contributed to this effect. In contrast,
there was no evidence of the picture-size manipulation producing an increased fluency for large
pictures as the reaction time for the CLJ trials for the large and the small pictures did not differ.
However, a methodological limitation might have concealed the potential increased fluency for
the large pictures. Specifically, in the current and the previous experiments as well as in all the
past studies using CLJs, a CLJ is made after a set duration of study time. For example, in my
studies participants studied the last example from a category for five seconds before being
prompted to make a CLJ. This practice of allocating a set time for studying the example before
making a CLJ for that category is intended to equate the study time between categories and is a
standard practice in the field because category learning itself is the focus of these studies in most
cases. However, in order to measure the fluency caused by the size or any other manipulations at
a given CLJ trial, the CLJ trial should not be preceded by a set study time because the reaction
time difference of 40-200 milliseconds would likely fall within the set study time and would not
be reflected in the latency for the CLJ trail. Such methodological change is also applicable for
other paradigm (e.g., word-list learning) and is necessary for future investigations focusing on
teasing apart the effect of belief and fluency on metacognitive judgements.
Interestingly, there was evidence that some kind of fluency contributed to higher CLJ
ratings as there was a weak but significant negative correlation between the latency for a CLJ
trial and the rating given in that trial (i.e., the faster to make a CLJ, the higher the rating: r = -.07
and -.04 in the current experiments and the previous experiments respectively; according to
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Cohen ,1988, r = -.10 represents a small correlation). It is important to note that this is likely a
different kind of fluency from the perceptual fluency (i.e., the ease or speed at which the
stimulus is processed) that larger pictures presumably produce. Rather, this is a retrieval or
inference fluency (i.e., the ease or speed at which information is retrieved or inference is made:
Benjamin & Bjork, 2014; Oppenheimer, 2008). When prompted to indicate the likelihood of
correctly identifying a member of a given category (i.e., CLJ) in the current study, participants
likely have taken the ease or speed at which they recalled the previous examples from that
category or the speed at which they inferred what the characteristic features were for that
category as the evidence of learning and assigned the rating accordingly. This is the first
evidence that such fluency contributed to CLJ ratings and adds to the emerging literature.

5.4 Practical Implications
The current study has various practical implications. First, as briefly mentioned in the
introduction, methods that can optimize category learning instruction are of interests to many
fields, such as K-12 education, physician training, and military training. The size-dependent
attentional shift demonstrated in the current study gives a clue to what the optimal size of
example-picture presentation would be depending on whether the diagnostic dimensions of the
target category structure are global or local. In addition, the category-appropriate-processing
(CAP) framework emphasizes the importance of analyzing the category structure in terms of its
diagnostic dimensions, similarity between categories, and the type of processing that are
beneficial for learning the given category structure. Such analyses allow a selection of
appropriate techniques to be applied, and it provides an excellent start point from which an
optimal category instruction can be built.
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Lastly, the metacognitive illusion produced by the large-picture size has various
implications as well. Pointing out situations in which learners’ metacognitive awareness is in a
stark contrast to the actual learning outcome is extremely important from an educational
perspective because when left to their own devices, learners will always choose the method of
studying that they think would produce better learning. As studying through the monitor of
various sizes is also becoming increasingly popular (i.e., reviewing lecture slides on a desktop
computer, watching a recorded lecture on a smartphone), disseminating the potential pitfall of
studying on a larger monitor may be useful. Of course, although I think it is very likely, whether
a large picture or monitor size produces a similar metacognitive illusion (i.e., inflated confidence
in learning) is an empirical question and awaits future research.

5.5 Summary and Concluding Comments
In the current dissertation, I reported the first empirical demonstrations of how the picture size
affected category learning and metacognition. The picture-size effect was category-structurespecific in that category structures with a global diagnostic dimension benefited from the smallpicture size whereas category structures with local diagnostic dimensions benefited from the
large-picture size. I proposed that this size-by-category-structure interaction was a product of the
size-dependent attentional shift between the features represented in different sizes (or spatial
frequencies) based on the basic characteristics of human visual system. Further, a novel
framework (i.e., category-appropriate-processing framework: CAP) encompassing the current
and the past findings was presented. This framework should serve as a good starting point in
constructing optimal category instruction of any kind and also generates interesting research
questions. The picture-size manipulation also affected metacognition; learners’ judgments on
their own learning were inflated with the large picture size in some situations. Given the wide71

spread practical implications of both the size-dependent attentional shift and the metacognitive
illusion as well as the increasing variability of the size of monitors through which information is
consumed, future research on the effect of stimulus size on a wide range of task performance and
subjective judgements are warranted.
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Appendix A
A Brief Description of the Pilot Study with Artificial Fish Material
In the original iteration of the dissertation, I attempted to test the unique predictions from the
perceptual precedence and the increased effort hypotheses by having participants learn and
classify artificial fish categories. This material was created by combining the shapes of fish that
were used in the previous experiments and geometric patterns using a raster graphic editor.
Critically, all instances were defined by 4 dimensions – the shape of the body (global), the shape
of the tail (local), the pattern of the body (global), and the pattern on the tail (local) – and in a
given experiment and condition, only one of the dimensions was diagnostic and all others had
zero diagnosticity. I took this approach initially because in the natural material many features are
correlated so that even in a material in which one dimension is predominantly diagnostic, other
dimension can carry some, albeit low, diagnosticity. Therefore, constructing a category structure
in which strictly one dimension was diagnostic offered an opportunity for the most stringent test
of the hypotheses.
Figures A1 (shape diagnostic) and A2 (pattern diagnostic) show the material used in
the first set of the pilot study. In Pilot Experiment 1 using the shape diagnostic material shown in
Figure A1, half the participants studied and classified categories organized by each row which
were defined by the shape of the body (global diagnostic condition) while the other half of the
participants studied and classified categories organized by each column which were defined by
the shape of the tail (local diagnostic condition). In Pilot Experiment 2 using the pattern
diagnostic material shown in Figure A2, half the participants studied and classified categories
organized by each row which were defined by the pattern on the body (global diagnostic
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condition) while the other half of the participants studied and classified categories organized by
each column which were defined by the pattern on the tail (local diagnostic condition).
Several iterations of pilot experiments were run using these materials both online with
participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk and in the lab with Washington University
undergraduate participants. Figure A3 show illustrative examples of the results. In short, the
small-picture-size advantage was not replicated, and the overall performance was too low; in
some cases the performance was barely above the chance (8% in classifying 12 categories). Even
when the performance was adequately high (the global diagnostic condition in the lab sample of
Experiment 2: ~30%), the picture-size effect did not emerge. Participants seemed to have
especially hard time using the information from the local dimension (the shape of and the pattern
on the tail).
Why did the picture-size effect fail to emerge in this category structure? Two notable
changes from the previous material are the introduction of the geometric pattern and the
reduction of the material complexity that came with it. First, participants’ attention seemed to be
drawn more to the geometric pattern than to the natural shape. This was evident in the near-floor
performance when the shape was diagnostic and the relatively higher performance when the
pattern was diagnostic. In retrospect, this inclination towards the pattern processing is
understandable because the extraction of the pattern features was easier and taxonomical terms
were readily available (e.g., thick vertical lines throughout the body, small circular dots on the
tail) whereas the shape features were more complex and harder to distinguish (e.g., thinner and
longer body with a fin on top, a sharp boomerang-shaped fin with equally long top and bottom
parts). Second, the geometric patterns inside the shape outline of the fish had only two features
(i.e., the pattern of the body and the pattern of the tail) whereas the natural material offered
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several features that were more complex, such as the pectoral fin, ear flap, and cheek. If the
picture-size effect hinged upon attentional shift between these complex features or increased
effort in processing these features, it is possible that the introduction of the easily extractable
geometric pattern and the reduction in the material complexity have compromised these
processes.
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Figure A1. Examples of the fish stimuli that were used in pilot experiments. Each row represents
a category that is defined by the shape of the body whereas each column represents a category
that is defined by the shape of the caudal fin (i.e. tail).
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Figure A2. Examples of the fish stimuli that were used in pilot experiments. Each row represents
a category that is defined by the pattern of the body whereas each column represents a category
that is defined by the pattern of the caudal fin (i.e. tail).
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Figure A3. The results from the first set of pilot experiments. The error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
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Appendix B
A Brief Description of the Second Set of Pilot Study with Artificial Fish Material
Given that the introduction of geometric patterns and the significant reduction in material
complexity may have compromised the processes underlying the picture-size effect, in the
second set of pilot study, I created an artificial fish category structure in which the shape of the
body (global) or the tail (local) was strictly diagnostic by combining natural shapes and natural
patterns using a raster graphics editor.
Figure B1 shows the material used in the second set of the pilot study. In Pilot
Experiment 2, half the participants studied and classified categories organized by each row
which were defined by the shape of the body (global diagnostic condition) while the other half of
the participants studied and classified categories organized by each column which were defined
by the shape of the tail (local diagnostic condition). Importantly, because all the features are
naturalistic, the material complexity is similar to the fish material with which the picture-size
effect has been previously demonstrated.
Figure B2 shows results from two pilot experiments using the artificial fish with natural
features. In the first iteration shown in the left panel, participants studied and classified 12
categories of artificial fish shown in Figure B1. Given the near floor performance in this
experiment, in the following experiment participants studied and classified six categories that
seemed to be as distinguish from each other. However, the picture size effect was not replicated
even when the performance was adequately high (in the global diagnostic condition).
The reason for why the picture-size effect failed to emerge using this material is unclear.
In the process of creating this artificial material, some crucial aspects of natural category likely
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have been disrupted. Nonetheless, given the difficulty in obtaining the picture-size effect using
artificial material, I decided to test the unique predictions form the two hypotheses by identifying
natural categories with clear global or local diagnostic dimension as reported in the current
dissertation.
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Figure B1. Examples of the fish stimuli that were used in pilot experiments. Each row represents
a category that is defined by the shape of the body whereas each column represents a category
that is defined by the shape of the caudal fin (i.e. tail).

90

Figure B2. The results from the second set of pilot experiments. The error bars represent ± 1
SEM.
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